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Sullivan: The Montana Law Of Valuation In Eminent Domain

COMMENTS

THE MONTANA LAW OF VALUATION IN EMINENT
DOMAIN
John F. Sullivan
During the last decade, and primarily because of the interstate
highway program, the amount of litigation concerning valuation in
eminent domain has increased tremendously in Montana. Though Montana's law of valuation is still in the formative stage, there is a sizeable
body of case law in need of classification, explanation, and critique.
The purpose of this comment on the Montana law of valuation in
eminent domain is to present the practicing attorney with a comprehensive survey of what that law is, and, concerning the income method
of valuation and opinion testimony of value, to critique decisions of
the Montana court and offer suggestions for reform. This comment
is limited almost exclusively to Montana law. Also, only the valuation
of real property taken or damaged in condemnation will be considered.
Generally, the following four topics will be considered: what the standard of valuation is; how this standard is applied to property taken or
damaged in condemnation; permissible evidence of value; and who has
the burden of proof.
THE STANDARD OF VALUATION IN EMINENT DOMAIN
EMINENT DOMAIN AND JUST COMPENSATION

REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, § 93-9901 (1947) [hereinafter cited as
R.C.M. 1947] defines eminent domain as "the right' of the state to take
private property 2 for public use." The right of eminent domain is
inherent in the sovereign state. It does not depend for its existence on
any constitutional or statutory grant.3 The right is, however, subject to
an important constitutional restriction, one which is the subject of this
comment.

Montana's Constitution provides that: "Private property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having
first been made to . . . the owner."'4 This constitutional restriction on
1

Eminent domain is, in the author's opinion, more accurately described as a power
rather than a right. See, EMINENT DOMAIN, A Research Report Preparedby the University of Montana School of Law for the Montana State Highway Commission, 32-33
(1967). However, the term "right" will be used in the text of this comment for the
sake of consistency.
The statute is erroneous, for in some cases public property may also be taken for a
public use. See, EMINENT DOMAIN, A Research Report Prepared by the University of
Montana School of Law for the Montana State Highway Commission, 33-34 (1967).
'State v. Aitchison, 96 Mont. 335, 341, 30 P.2d 805 (1934).
'MONT. CONST. art. III, § 14. Montana's new constitution, in article II, § 29, provides
that: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
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the right of eminent domain is simply a condition precedent of the payment of just compensation to the owner for that which is to be taken
or damaged by the condemnor.
Just compensation, as the name implies, is an equitable standard,
measured by the traditionally flexible principles of equity. Accordingly,
"Its measure varies with the facts," 5 and "no one formula or method
of measurement universally applies to all cases." 6 Just compensation
is a relative measure.
Though ultimately a question of the unique facts of each case, a
formula has been developed by which courts and juries may, with some
theoretical degree of accuracy and consistency, give concrete meaning
to the amorphous standard of just compensation. While courts must
not, as a matter of constitutional law, adhere inflexibly to a general
formula for the assessment of just compensation, a general formula
has evolved.
Market Value-The Usual Standard
There are three standards by which just compensation could be
measured. These are: value to the taker, value to the owner, and
market value. Of these, market value is the usual standard for measuring just compensation. Value to the owner and value to the taker are
probably rejected as standards since they are subjective and would
result in awards of compensation that would economically prohibit
7
public improvements.
Montana uses the usual market value standard. R.C.M. 1947, §
93-9913, which is a statutory implementation of the constitutional requirement of just compensation, 8 provides that: "For the purpose of

compensation to the full extent of the loss having been first made to or paid into court
for the owner." So far as the standard of compensation is concerned the new provision is identical to that in the present constitution, except for the addition of the
phrase "to the full extent of the loss." The only official comment of the Constitutional Convention on the meaning of this added phrase is to the effect that it was not
intended to make any substantive change in the valuation standard. The phrase was
inserted to simply remind the Montana court to continue to recognize that the land-'
owner's compensation should be just. PROCEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIoN, pp. 5636-5637 (1972).
'Alexander v. State Highway Comm'n, 147 Mont. 367, 372, 411 P.2d 414 (1966).
-eState Highway Comm'n v. Tubbs, 147 Mont. 296, 301, 411 P.2d 739 (1966).
'There are, however, some cases in which value to the owner or value to the taker may
properly be considered in arriving at just compensation. For example, where property
is presently adaptable to the public use for which it is being taken or damaged, and
this adaptability contributes to the property's market value, the value of the property
to the taker should be considered. Here there is no real deviation from the usual market value standard since in such a case value to the taker constitutes an element of the
* property's market value. Likewise, where property is of a kind which has no readily
ascertainable market value (churches, hospitals, and the like, which are rarely sold),
the value of the property to the owner should be given consideration as a means by
which the usual standard, market value, may be ascertained. 4 NICHOLS, EMINENT
DOMAIN, § 12.1 [5] (3d ed. 1971); State Highway Comm'n v. Tubbs, supra note 6 at
303.
'State Highway Comm'n v. Vaughan, 155 Mont. 277, 281, 470 P.2d 967 (1970).
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assessing compensation . . . its actual value . . . shall be the measure
of compensation for all property to be actually taken, and the basis
of depreciation in value of property not actually taken, but injuriously
affected." (Emphasis supplied.) The "actual value" mentioned in this
statute usually means "market value."9
Market value is "the price that would in all probability result from
fair negotiation, where the seller is willing to sell and the buyer desires
to buy."'10 Therefore, in ascertaining the amount which the owner is
entitled to receive, "the court is bound to take into consideration every
element of value which would be taken into consideration if the plaintiff
were negotiating a sale with the defendants as a willing purchaser and
the defendants were willing sellers.""
THE TIME OF VALUATION

Since the market value of property fluctuates, a time must be set
at which the market value of the property is to be determined. All jurisdictions agree that the time of valuation is when the property is taken
or damaged, "but there is a great diversity of opinion as to just when
that point in time occurs."'1 2 In Montana, property is by statute deemed
to have been taken or damaged at the date of the service of summons
13
in the condemnation action.
An important corollary to the "date of service" rule is the general
rule that only evidence of things which affect the market value of the
property prior to the date of service is relevant to prove the amount
of just compensation to the owner. There are, however, two important
exceptions to this rule. The first exception concerns the case of tho
after-discovered gold mine, the situation where a condition which would
affect the value of the property existed at the time of service, but was
not discovered until later. As yet the Montana supreme court has not
4
had an opportunity to recognize this exception.'
*Id. at 282; State Highway Comm'n v. Jacobs, 150 Mont. 322, 326, 435 P.2d 274
(1967); State Highway Comm'n v. Tubbs, supra note 6 at 301; State Highway
Comm'n v. Woodcock, 147 Mont. 291, 294, 411 P.2d 357 (1966); State Highway
Comm'n v. Peterson, 134 Mont. 52, 70, 328 P.2d 617 (1958); State v. Lee, 103 Mont.
482, 485, 63 P.2d 135 (1936); State v. Hoblitt, 87 Mont. 403, 413, 288 P. 181 (1930).
0
" State Highway Comm'n v. Jacobs, supra note 9 at 326; State Highway Comm'n v.
Woodcock, supra note 9 at 294; State Highway Comm 'n v. Tubbs, supra note 6 at 301;
State Highway Comm'n v. Milanovich, 142 Mont. 410, 419, 384 P.2d 752 (1963);
State Highway Comm'n v. Peterson, supra note 9 at 70; State v. Lee, supra note 9 at
485; and State v. Hoblitt, supra note 9 at 413.
'Yellowstone Park R.R. Co. v. Bridger Coal Co., 34 Mont. 545, 556, 87 P. 963 (1906).
'24 NiCHOLS, EMINENT DOmAiN, § 12.23 (3d ed. 1971).
nR.C.M. 1947, § 93-9913.
"If and when the court has cause to recognize this exception, it should do so. There are
two reasons for this:. (1) jurisdictions which have considered this exception recognize
it; and (2) logic and equity support recognition of the exception. The argument from
logic may have particular significance in Montana, since this is a jurisdiction which
measures just compensation by a statutory actual value standard. In 4 NicHOLS,
EMINENT DomAiN, § 12.231 (3d ed. 1971) the argument from logic is set forth as
follows:

In jurisdictions where "actual value" is the object sought, it has been
held that such knowledge may be considered. The thing to be ascer-
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The second exception concerns the case where significant events
which occur because of the taking or damaging are not anticipated at
the date of service. The issue here is whether evidence of actual results
of a taking or damaging are admissible, when the results occurred
after the date of service. In State Highway Comm'n v. Biastoch Meats,
Inc.,15 the landowner was allowed to introduce evidence that a partial
taking of his land for construction of an interstate highway had eliminated an old water channel and diked up a new channel. The net
result, in the owner's opinion, was that his land had been converted into
a flood basin. The usual "date of service" rule was noted, but it was
nevertheless held that actual results of a taking or damaging, even
though subsequent to the date of service, are proper. The court quoted
Nichols with approval:
[I]t was formerly considered that the jury was bound to shut its

eyes to everything which had actually occurred after the taking, and
it was held that evidence could be admitted only as to the character
of the structure that would probably be erected, its probable effect
on the remaining land ....

The modern and more enlightened rule

is that it is competent to show the mode in which the work was
actually constructed, the actual effect of its construction and operation upon the remaining land ... "
One can have no quarrel with this rule, since it clearly promotes the
ultimate goal of the valuation process, the just and accurate compen,
sation of the landowner for value actually lost. This rule is, however,
subject to a qualification stated in Montana Railroad Co. v. Freeser.1 7 In
this case it was said that, though the actual results of a taking or damaging could be shown, "If the improvements are improperly or negligently constructed, no additional damages should be given for this
reason.""' Actual effect evidence may be used only insofar as the
improvements have been properly constructed in the manner proposed
by the condemnor. 19 This qualification made sense in Freeser, where
the landowner Was attempting to recover for prospective damages because of improper construction. The court correctly held that if and

tained, runs the argument, is not market value, but actual value. Market value is taken as the criterion of compensation, based on the proposition that it is the true measure of actual value--the only practical
test. But in a case where discoveries made after the date as of which
valuation is normally made demonstrate that the actual intrinsic value
of the land at that date was greater than its market value, in other
words, when it appears that market value is not a criterion of actual
value, these discoveries should be taken into consideration.
The more appealing and direct argument from equity is stated as follows in
EMINENT DOMAIN,

§ 77 (1st ed. 1953):

JAHR,

[T]he valuation of property taken by eminent domain is governed-by
equitable principles. It would therefore constitute an injustice to the
owner to exclude from the consideration by the jury of a material element that enhances the value of the property acquired.
15State Highway Comm'n v. Biastoch Meats, Inc., 145 Mont. 261, 400 P.2d 274 (1965).
"OId.
at 271.
"7Montana Railroad Co. v. Freeser, 29 Mont. 210, 74 P. 407 (1903).
'Id. at 214.
OId.
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when damage occurred because of improper construction or maintenance,
the owner could maintain a subsequent action.2 0 However, when the
damage from the actual results of construction is presently ascertainable, the Freeser rule results in an undesirable multiplicity of actions.
In such a case it ought not matter whether the improvements are properly or improperly constructed.
JUST COMPENSATION FOR TAKING OR DAMAGING PRIVATE
PROPERTY
JUST COMPENSATION FOR TAKING PRIVATE PROPERTY

For private property taken for a public use the owner must be
awarded just compensation. 21 This means that the owner must be awarded
the actual or market value of the property at the time of service of
the summons.22 At times it may be a difficult question whether there has
been a taking of private property; however, the Montana court has not
had to decide this question in any of its potentially numerous fact
situations.
JUST COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGING PRIVATE PROPERTY

When private property is damaged for a public use, the Montana
constitution requires that the owner receive just compensation. 23 The
law of just compensation when private property is damaged is vastly
more complex than that which governs a taking. A proper summary
of Montana law on the subject requires a consideration of the following
topics: damage without a taking, damage to the remainder of that which
is taken, how damages are measured, noncompensable damages, and
deduction of benefits.
A.

Damage Without A Taking

Under Montana's constitutional "taken or damaged" provision it is
evident that "it is not necessary that there be any physical invasion
[or taking] of an individual's property for public use to entitle him to
compensation. 2' 4 All that is required is that the owner's property be
deemed to have suffered "damage."
The, obvious problem, therefore, is determining what constitutes
compensable damage, damage in the constitutional sense. The problem
is not an easy one in terms of either law or fact: like so much of the
law of valuation in eminent domain, "damage" is an elastic, relative
concept.
"1Id.at 216.%
"MONT. CONST. art. II, § 14.
"R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-9912 (1) and 93-9913. Also, where land is taken for a railroad,
R.C.M.. 1947, § 93-9912 (4) provides that the landowner must also be awarded "the
cost of good and sufficient fences along the line of such railroad, and the cost of cattle
guards where fences may cross the line of such railroad."
2'MoNT. CONST. art. III, § 14.
"Root v. Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Ry. Co., 20 Mont. 354, 358, 51 P. 155 (1897).
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It is elementary that damage, to be compensable, must be damage
to property. Damage does not include the owner's annoyance or personal inconvenience nor "mere infringement of the owner's personal
'25
pleasure or enjoyment.
In some jurisdictions the rule is that damage includes only those
injuries that would have been actionable at common law if inflicted
without statutory authority. 28 While damage certainly ought to include
that for which there was common law liability, compensation should
not be limited by common law restrictions, since "many of the injuries
from public improvements which cause the greatest hardship to individuals would not be actionable at common law. '27 For example, at common
law compensation was not required for much of the damage resulting
from a change in grade of a street. "It was considered that, public
improvements being for the good of the body politic, and always being
in contemplation, the individual purchased his . . . property charged
with knowledge that changes might be made as required by public
necessity and convenience. ' 28 In Less v. City of Butte,29 the Montana
court properly held that the constitutional provision requiring just
compensation for damage "abrogated this harsh rule,"' 0 and "overturns
the doctrine that one owning . . . property must continually live in
dread of the changing whims of successive boards of aldermen." 3' Clearly, the rule in Montana is that damage is not restricted to that which
was actionable at common law. Though there are no Montana cases,
that which was actionable at common law should be held to be compensable damage.
Beyond common law liability courts have suggested two definitions
of compensable damage. First, damage might include any decrease in
the market value of property. Such a generous provision for injured
Montana landowners has, however, been rejected. 2 Our court has said:
"[T]he constitution does not authorize a remedy for every diminution
in the value of property which is caused by public improvement. 8' 8 The
alternative and Montana rule is that, in the absence of common law
34
liability, damages must be "special" in order to be compensable.
'Less v. City of Butte, 28 Mont. 27, 33, 72 P. 140 (1903).
22A NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 6.441[2] (3d ed. 1970).
"Id.
BLess v. City of Butte, supra note 25 at 31.
'Less v. City of Butte, supra note 25.
80Id. at 31.
"Id. at 32.
OId. at 33. While the Montana court has never clearly articulated a reason for rejecting
this definition, one gets the feeling, from reading State ex rel. Johnson v. Board of
Commissioners of Deer Lodge County, 19 Mont. 582, 42 P. 147 (1897), that the court
considers such a definition prohibitive of public improvement, too expensive a burden
for the condemnor to bear.
'Less v. City of Butte, supra note 25 at 33.
8State ex rel. Johnson v. Board of County Commissioners of Deer Lodge County, supra
note 32 at 584.
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Special damage may be generally defined as that which is "in
'3 5
and "not common
excess of that sustained by the community at large,
'3 6
explained by
best
are
definitions
These
to the public in general.
in fact,
damage
dividing special damages into two classes: (1) special
of the
right
a
private
and (2) special damage by virtue of invasion of
property owner.
The criteria for the first category, special damage in fact, is that
the property suffer some peculiar and direct physical injury cognizable
to the senses.3 7 For example, in Root v. Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Ry.
Co.," a railroad was authorized by a city ordinance to be constructed
and operated along a city street in Anaconda. The plaintiff-landowner
contended that the operation of the railroad forty-six feet from his
lodging house had depreciated its market value. Specifically, he complained of noise from the passing of trains, shaking of the windows
of his house, ringing of bells, and the sounding of whistles. The court
held that this kind of damage was special if "in excess of that sustained by the community at large."3 9
The standard for the second category, special damage by virtue of
invasion of a private right of the property owner, is that there be disturbed some property right which the owner holds in connection with
or appurtenant to his property and which is not shared in common
with the public in general. For example, in Less it was said that an
owner whose property abuts a public street has appurtenant easements
in the public street for the purpose of giving to the property light, air,
and access. 40 Unreasonable interference with these easements appurtenant
only to the abutting property, as by a change of grade or erection of
a structure in the highway, requires just compensation to the owner. 41
To complete this brief survey of special damage, a word must be
said about the invasion of a public right absent some peculiar and
direct physical injury cognizable to the senses. In this situation landowners undoubtedly suffer varying degrees of injury. It seems at first
logical to conclude that those who suffer damage "in excess of that
sustained by the community at large" have suffered special, compensable
damage. But one must remember that additionally the damage suffered
must be "not common to the public in general." And when a public
right is invaded, all members of the public suffer a damage of the
same character and flature. Though it may appear that an owner
suffers special damage because invasion of the public right causes him
more hardship than others, the damage is in fact not special because the

$1Root v. Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Ry.Co., supra note 24 at 358.
'Id.

at 359.

§ 6.4431 (3d ed. 1970).
8Root v. Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Ry. Co., supra note 24.
Id. at 358.
0
" Less v. City of Butte, supra note 25 at 32.
872A NIcHOLs, EMIENT DOMAIN,

"Id.
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right which is invaded, and from which the injury flows, is shared by
all members of the public. 42 For example, in State ex rel. Johnson v.
Board of Commissioners of Deer Lodge County,43 a landowner sued for
damages on account of the vacating of a public road by the board of
county commissioners. In holding that no recovery was allowed, the
court said:
All who use the road suffer in the same manner. While one may
be more largely injured than others, he yet sustains damages of

the same character and nature which all who use the road-the
public generally-suffer. While the road exists he has the right

to the easement. But this right is not different from that enjoyed
by the public generally. His right, then, is such as is enjoyed by the
public. His damages are those shared by the public, and no other.

It is well settled that in such a case recovery cannot be had by a
citizen."
Thus, damages without a taking are compensable only in two instances: (1) where the damage would have been actionable at common
law if inflicted without statutory authority; and (2) where the damage
is special, that is, where there is a peculiar and direct physical invasion
cognizable to the senses or where there is an invasion of a private right
which the landowner holds in connection with his property.
B.

Damage To The Remainder Of That Which Is Taken

R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9912 (2) provides:
If the property sought to be appropriated constitutes only a part
of a larger parcel, [the owner must be awarded as part of his just
compensation] the depreciation in value which will accrue to the
portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance
from the portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of

the improvements in the manner proposed by the plaintiff.
The first problem raised by this statutory provision is determining
what constitutes a "part of a larger parcel." This is an important
determination in many eminent domain cases, since the statute clearly
limits the award of damages to the larger parcel. The landowner will
not be compensated for injury caused by the public improvement to
parcels of land other than or independent of that from which land is
45
actually taken.
There are generally three tests for determining whether a parcel
of land constitutes a remainder of that which is taken: (1) unity of
ownership of the two parcels; (2) contiguity of the two parcels; and
(3) unity of use of the two parcels. 46 Unity of ownership means that
one person, entity, or group of persons or entities owns that which is
taken and that which is claimed to be its remainder. Contiguity means
"State ex rel Johnson v. Board of County Commissioners of Deer Lodge County, supra
note 32.
43Id.
"Id. at 584.
mUnless, of course, the injury constitutes a damage without a taking, discussed above.
"State Highway Comm'n v. Robertson & Blossom, 151 Mont. 205, 219, 441 P.2d 181
(1968).
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physical togetherness, "not separated by distance nor by other tracts
of land. '47 If the land is a physically single unit, it matters not that
it is divided into separate parcels by mere imaginary lines not located
48
on the land but created by law and simply reflected on a map. Unity
of use means that the two parcels are "used jointly by the owner in a
single enterprise [so that] . . .the whole .. .is depreciated in value
by the proposed improvement. '49 The parcels must be "so inseparably
connected in the use to which they are applied that injury to or
50
destruction of one must necessarily and permanently injure the other."
A claim of unity of use may be based on a prospective, future use, if
such a use is reasonably probable and "not a dream concocted or contrived with the purposeful intent of obtaining a larger settlement from
512
the [condemnor]. "51 Whether there is unity of use is a question of fact.
Of the three criteria, unity of use is the most important, since it is
the basis of an exception to the previously stated general rule. In
State v. Hoblitt,5 8 the Montana court said that even though two tracts
are non-contiguous by virtue of separation by a highway, watercourse,
54
or railroad; if there is unity of use they will be held but a single parcel.
Unity of use may in some cases overcome the absence of contiguity. But
this exception applies only where the alleged remainder is not "separated by too great a distance from the land condemned and taken." 55
Also, the converse-contiguity without unity of use-is not an exception
to the general rule. Where a single parcel is not used as a single
entity by the owner, the parts will be held independent even though
contiguous, and no compensation for damages to the remainder will be
allowed. 55
Once it has been established that there is a remainder to what is
taken, the problem becomes one of determining the damage to the
remainder which are recognized as compensable. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9912
(2) provides that the owner must be awarded the "depreciation in
value [of the remainder] . . . by reason of its severance from the
portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improvements in the manner proposed by the plaintiff." The statute provides
for two kinds of damage, namely, severance and consequential damage.
A severance damage award compensates for the value lost because the
taking makes the parcel of land smaller or different in shape. Compensation for severance damage represents recognition of the fact that

'TState Highway Comm 'n v. Milanovich, supra note 10 at 416.
laid.

4State v. Hoblitt, supra note 9 at 408.
"°State v. Bradshaw Land Co., 99 Mont. 95, 107, 43 P.2d 674 (1935).
O'State Highway Comm 'n v. Milanovich, supra note 10 at 417.
5BId.
5State v. Hoblitt, supra note 9.
"Id. at 408.
"State ighway Comm 'n v. Milanovich, supra note 10 at 416; State v. Bradshaw Land
Co., supra note 50 at 105-107.
"State Highway Comm'n v. Milanovich, supra note 10 at 415-418.
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land has inherent value as being part of a larger tract. Imagine, for
instance, the severance damage which would result from taking a single
hole of an eighteen-hole golf course.
An award of consequential damages compensates for value lost because of the construction and operation of a public improvement. As a
general rule:
[A]ny element of damage which results in a diminution of value of
the remainder area is a factor which must be considered. The
different elements of damage to remaining land recoverable when
part of a tract is taken are as numerous as the possible forms of
injury.'
There is no requirement that the damages be special or actionable at
common law, as was the case with damages without a taking. Moreover,
as the statute provides, the measure of damages is the "depreciation in
value"; consequently, damages are not to be itemized with a monetary
award for each element. Rather, they are to be considered only insofar
as they decrease the value of the remainder. 5
Generally, the only limitation placed on the consideration of elements
of severance and consequential damages is that they be caused by the
public improvement for which land is taken and they be capable and
being reasonably ascertained. "[R]ecoverable damages must be the
natural and proximate consequence of the taking; they must be direct
and certain, actual, reasonable and readily ascertainable, not remote,
speculative or contingent."59 Damage is not compensable if it is "remote,
obscure, undefinable, problematical, or the like."60 Some examples are
helpful to illustrate the meaning of these limitations. In State v. Bradshaw Land Co.,61 part of a cattle ranch was taken for construction of a
highway. The landowner, over objection, introduced evidence on the
necessity of fencing the highway,
[Aind that, after fencing, with the ends of the land open, range
cattle would stray on the highway, and that these cattle upon
smelling the water, presumably in Locate Creek, and being alarmed
by motorcars upon the highway, would break through the fences
and thereby make it necessary for defendant, in the winter-time
in particular and during other seasons, to employ additional help
to repair the fences and remove trespassing livestock a
As might be suspected, evidence of this kind of consequential damage
was held "too remote, speculative and conjectural to be received. 6 3
In State Highway Comm'n v. Antonioli,6 4 part of a mining claim had

14A NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 14.24 (3d ed. 1971); Lewis & Clark County v. Nett,
81 Mont. 261, 266, 263 P. 418 (1928).
69Lewis & Clark County v. Nett, supra note 57 at 267.
wId. at 265.
O'State Highway Comm'n v. Antonioli, 145 Mont. 411, 420, 401 P.2d 563 (1965).
aState v. Bradshaw Land Co., supra note 50.
02d. at 110.
431d.
OState Highway Comm 'a v. Antonioli, supra note 60.
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been taken for construction of a highway. Without showing that the
claim contained ore worth mining, the landowner introduced evidence
that
[TJhe taking of the part for the highway so cramped the remainder
that there would not be room for a generating plant, dry house,
powder magazine, mine building, loading ramps, storage, dump
space, etc. In addition, testimony was received to the effect that if
the claim were mined directly under the Interstate [highway] the
operation would have to cease within 100 feet of the surface lest the
roadbed cave in.'
In response to this claim of severance damage the court noted that
The truth is that the mine is unopened now, . . [has not been
worked for 65 years], and has no surface structure presently other
than an old concrete hoist foundation. All of the surface facilities
referred to are not currently in existence and there is no proof
that any of them will ever be required. For this reason such evidence
of damage may not be received as it is speculative and conjectural.'
Finally, there are some elements of damage which the law considers to be noncompensable. These will be discussed in detail later.
C. How Damages Are Measured
Generally the owner of land damaged with or without a taking
is entitled to receive as compensation the decrease in the market value
of the land.6 7 However, where the damage may be corrected or cured, the
cost of cure is the measure of damages if this cost is less than the
decrease in the market value of the property.65
If land is damaged without a taking and the decrease in its market
value is the proper measure of damages, this decrease is computed by
applying a before and after rule. Just compensation equals the difference between "the value of the land prior to the injury and its value
'69
after the injury.
On the other hand, if land is damaged because of a taking and the
decrease in its market value is the proper measure of damages, the
decrease may be computed in one of two ways. First, the value of the
land taken may be added to the difference in the value of the remainder
area before and after the taking. Nichols expresses this rule in formula
forms as follows:
Value of land taken + (value of remainder area before taking value of remainder area after taking) = just compensation.'
The second method is a modified version of the before and after rule

01d. at 418.
OeId.

OLewis & Clark County v. Nett, supra note 57 at 266; Eby v. City of Lewistown, 55
Mont. 113, 126, 173 P. 1163 (1918).
wEby v. City of Lewistown, supra note 67 at 126; Wright v. City of Butte, 64 Mont.
362, 369, 210 P. 78 (1922).
6"Watson v. Colusa-Parrot M. & S. Co., 31 Mont. 513, 518, 79 P. 14 (1905); Sweeney v.
Montana Central Ry. Co., 25 Mont. 543, 552, 65 P. 912 (1901).
' 04A NICHOLs, EMINENT DoMAnq, § 14.23 (3d ed. 1971).
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mentioned above in connection with damages without a taking. Under
this rule damages are intermingled with the award for the value of
the land taken, with the total award computed by determining the
difference between the value of the entire tract before the taking and
the value of the remainder after the taking. In formula form Nichols
represents this rule as follows:
Value of entire parcel before taking - value of remainder area
after taking = just compensation.'
Prior to 1971 it would have been difficult to determine accurately which
of these two methods was to be used in Montana. Some of the early
decisions contain language which would support an argument for the
before and after rule.7 2 More recent decisions, however, enunciate damage measurement rules which are nearly identical to the first formula
set forth above. In Lewis and Clark County v. Nett 7 3 the court said:
"The measure of damages . . . is the fair market value of the land
sought to be condemned with the depreciation of such value of the
land from which the strip is to be taken. . . ,,14The court was even
more explicit in State Highway Comm'n v. Jacobs, 75 where it said: "The
compensation due . . .is the value of what was taken . . . plus any
depreciation in value of the property not actually taken but injuriously
76
affected.
Any lingering doubts about the vitality of the before and after
rule in Montana were quieted by State Highway Comm'n v. Emery.77 In
this case the trial court had instructed the jury to find separately: (1)
the value of the land taken; and (2) the damages to the remainder.
Clearly, this instruction on the form of the verdict required a computation of damages to the remainder in accordance with the first
formula set forth above. On appeal the trial court's instruction was
sustained on the authority of Nett, and, more importantly, by the court's
opinion that R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9912 "specifically requires (1) the taking
to be assessed and (2) loss to the remaining land from the taking to be
assessed.178 By negative inference the rule of Emery is that R.C.M.
"id.
"Montana Railway Co. v. Warren, 6 Mont. 275, 277-278, 12 P. 641 (1887), aff'd, 137

U.S. 348 (1890).
"Lewis & Clark County v. Nett, supra note 57.
7id. at 266.
"State Highway Comm'n v. Jacobs, 150 Mont. 322, 435 P.2d 274 (1967).
76Id. at 326.
"State Highway Comm'n v. Emery, 156 Mont. 507, 481 P.2d 686 (1971).
"Id. at 512. See, State Highway Comm'n v. Manry, 143 Mont. 382, 386, 390 P.2d 97
(1964); State Highway Comm'n v. City Service Co., 142 Mont. 559, 562, 385 P.2d 604
(1963); and State Highway Commn'n v. Heltborg, 140 Mont. 196, 204, 369 P.2d 521
(1962). The portion of R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9912 which the court relied on in Einery
provides that there shall be ascertained:
1. The value of the property sought to be appropriated and all
improvements thereon pertaining to the realty ....
2. If the property sought to be appropriated constitutes only a
part of a larger parcel, the depreciation in value which will accrue to
the portion not sought to be condemned, and the construction of the
improvements in the manner proposed by the plaintiff.
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1947, § 93-9912 prohibits use of the before and after rule to compute
damages in the case of a partial taking.
The principal merit of the before and after rule is that it is the
easiest of the compensation measuring rules to apply. For this reason,
it is the favorite of the commentators.7 9 In spite of these considerations
there are a number of reasons why in Montana the split-verdict formula
is the preferable one.
The practical argument in favor of the split-verdict formula is
that, though theoretically more difficult to apply, the split-verdict has
been used in numerous recent cases without any apparent difficulties.
Moreover, either formula should yield the same result.
Two equitable arguments may be made for the split-verdict formula.
First, it may have tax advantages for the landowner, in that
[1]f there is no severance of damages the whole award will be
treated as the purchase price of the land condemned, with the
resulting increase in profit; whereas if there is a severance the
damage to the residue may be treated as a reduction in the cost
basis of the remaining land.'
Second, the split-verdict formula provides a safeguard against jury
awards which are contrary to the evidence. In two instances in Montana"' use of this formula has resulted in overturning jury verdicts in
excess of the compensation requested by the landowners. In both cases
the verdicts were within the range of total compensation requested, but
above that requested for the land taken8 2 or the damages to the remainder. s3 Neither of these would have been detected if the before and
after rule had been applied, since under this rule the jury is required
to award a single sum as compensation for both the land taken and
damages to the remainder.
Finally, the before and after rule encounters insurmountable problems under Montana's rule for the deduction of benefits from the award
of compensation (discussed in detail later). In Montana benefits may
be deducted only from damages to the remainder. This is no problem
under the split-verdict formula, with its requisite separate amount for
damage to the remainder. However, under the before and after rule's
single sum award benefits could not properly be deducted without first
computing separately the damages to the remainder. When this is accomplished the basic argument in favor of before and after-convenience
and ease of application-disappears. Of course, this problem only arises
in cases where there are benefits to deduct. But it would be absurd, and

W4A NIcHOLS, EMINENT

DOMAIN,

§

14.232[l]

(3d ed. 1971); 1 ORGEL, VALUATION

UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN, § 51 (2d ed. 1953).
801 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN, § 50, n. 18

(2d ed. 1953).

8Emery, supra note 77; State Highway Comm'n v. Barnes, 151 Mont. 300, 443 P.2d
16 (1968).
EState Highway Comm'n v. Barnes, supra note 81.
State Highway Comm'n v. Emery, supra note 77.
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doubly confusing, to use the split-verdict formula in this case and
before and after where no benefits are involved. This is especially true
when the split-verdict formula is apparently satisfactory, may have
tax advantages to the landowner, and prevents excessive and unjust
jury awards.
D.

Noncompensable Damages

There are some damages that the law does not recognize as compensable. Though the landowner will receive just compensation, he will not
necessarily be fully indemnified for all of the injuries which a condemnation has caused.
Some items of damage are noncompensable because just compensation is defined in terms of the market value of that which is taken or
damaged. Thus, a landowner may not be compensated for mental
anguish caused by condemnation.8 4 Also, when land is taken by condemnation the title to personalty on the land taken is not affected.
Thus, the owner may remove it. 5 Most courts hold that since the condemnor is required to pay only for that which is taken or damaged,
it is not constitutionally required to pay for the costs of removing
personalty.5 6 In Montana the question whether removal costs of personalty is constitutionally compensable has not yet been decided. How,
ever, from 1957 to 1961, and from 1967 to 1969, R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9913
provided for payment by the condemnor of removal costs for per7
sonalty.
Some noncompensable damages are based on a court's finding that
no right of the landowner has been taken or damaged. For example, a
landowner whose property abuts a public thoroughfare receives no compensation for the decrease in the market value of his property caused
by a relocation 8 or discontinuance8 9 of the thoroughfare. This rule

"State Highway Comm'n v. Danielsen, 146 Mont. 539, 545, 409 P.2d 443 (1965).
84A NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, §

14.2471[2] (3d ed. 1971).

SId.
For instances of judicial interpretation of these provisions, see, State Highway
Comm 'n v. City Service Co., supra note 78 at 564-565; and State Highway Comm 'n v.
Manry, supra note 78 at 387. Much of the hardship of the rule forbidding recovery
of removal costs has been mitigated by federal legislation. For example, the Uniform
Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (P.L. 91646, 84 Stat. 1894) contains numerous provisions designed to ease the landowner 's
burden in relocating. The philosophy of this Act is stated in § 201: " [P]ersons displaced . . . [should] not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs designed for the benefit of the public as a whole." Among other things, § 202 provides
for payment to the landowner of the costs of removing personalty. The Act only applies where displacement results from federal or federally assisted programs, but as
a practical matter this provides fairly adequate coverage in Montana where most of
the present displacement is due to the federally assisted interstate highway program.
EState Highway Comm'n v. Peterson, supra note 9 at 67-68.
EState v. Hoblitt, supra note 9 at 411. There is language in Root v. Butte, Anaconda
&-Pacific Ry. Co., supra note 24 at 360, which appears contrary to the position stated
in Hoblitt. However, since Hoblitt postdates Root, Boot must be held overruled on
this point. See also, State ex rel. Johnson v. Board of County Commissioners of Deer
Lodge County, supra note 32; and State v. Bradshaw Land Co., supra note 50.
87
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applies in Montana regardless of whether or not a taking accompanies
the relocation or discontinuance.9 0 The reason for this rule has been
stated by the Montana court as follows:
The owner of land abutting on a highway established by the
public has no property or other vested right in the continuance of it
as a highway at public expense, and, at least in the absence of deprivation of ingress and egress, cannot claim damages for its mere
discontinuance, although such discontinuance diverts traffic form his
door and diminishes his trade and thus depreciates the value of
his land.'
This unwillingness to find a right or protected interest in a given traffic
flow has been justified on two practical grounds. First,
Our... highways are built and maintained to meet public necessity
and convenience in travel, and not for the enhancement of property
of occasional land owners along the route. Benefits which come and
go with changing currents of public travel are not matters in which
any individual has any vested right against the judgment of those
public officials whose duty it is to build and maintain these highways.9
Second, to allow compensation for diversion of traffic would economically prohibit valuable and necessary public improvements. If such
compensation were allowed, imagine its amount in those instances where
a controlled-access highway bypasses an entire community, an event
which is most common in Montana.
Similar to the cases in which damage is held noncompensable because no vested right is invaded are those in which some right of a landowner is held noncompensably subordinate to a public right. In this
situation the court holds the invasion of the landowner's right to be
merely police power regulation rather than compensable confiscation
under eminent domain. In the case of highways, for example:
[T]he use of highways and streets may be limited, controlled and
regulated by the public authority in the exercise of the police
power, whenever, and to the extent necessary to provide for and
promote the safety, peace, health, morals and general welfare to
the people, and is subject [without compensation] to such reasonable
and impartial regulations adopted pursuant to this power as are
calculated to secure to the general public the largest practical benefit
from the enjoyment of the easement, and to provide for their safety
while using it."
Restrictions on the right of access are a good Montana example of
the application of the doctrine of noncompensation for injury due to
police power regulation. It has been held that "the right of access ...
is subject to the public's primary right to regulate traffic and travel
on the street and is the right of reasonable ingress and egress from the
abutting highway. '94 A median strip, or traffic divider, has been held
93Cf., State Highway Comm'n v. Peterson, supra note 9, with In re Appropriation
for Highway Purposes, 13 Ohio App.2d 125, 234 N.E.2d 514 (1968).
r ' State v. Hoblitt, supra note 9 at 411.
04A NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 14.244[4] (3d ed. 1971).
"State Highway Comm'n v. Keneally, 142 Mont. 256, 267, 384 P.2d 770 (1963); Kipp
v. Davis-Daly Copper Co., 41 Mont. 509, 516-525, 110 P. 237 (1.910),.
9"State Highway Comm'n v. Keneilly, .Rutpr(i note 93 at 265.
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not to be an unreasonable restriction on the right of access.9 5 Damages
to property caused by installation of a median are, therefore, not compensable.9 6 Moreover, "the right of access does not embrace all points
97
on the common boundary on the entire length of the highway."
Thus, the landowner "may not insist on the maintenance and construction of the road in such a way as to afford him direct access to his
9g
'
property at all adjacent points.
In some cases damages are held noncompensable because of arbitrary
statutory prescriptions. Under R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9921 court costs in a
condemnation action are allowed only at the discretion of the trial
court.9 9 Since court costs include only those items recognized by
statute, 10 0 attorney's fees' 01 and special expert witness fees' 0 2 are in all
cases excluded. 0 Likewise, since R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9913 provides that
a taking or damaging is deemed to occur at the time of the service of
summons in the condemnation action, damage caused by acts preliminary
"State Highway Comm 'n v. McGaffick, 144 Mont. 76, 79, 394 P.2d 174 (1964); see also,
State Highway Comm'n v. Keneally, supra note 93 at 265.
"State Highway Comm'n v. MeGaffick, supra note 95 at 79. In some instances an interference with access may be held reasonable or unreasonable as a matter of law, but
the question is usually one of fact for the jury. State Highway Comm'n v. Keneally,
supra note 93 at 265; State Highway Comm 'n v. Manry, supra note 78 at 385.
"'State Highway Comm'n v. Keneally, supra note 93 at 267.
Id.
"State v. Bradshaw Land Co., supra note 50 at 113.
10®See, R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-8601 through 93-8631; Montana Ore Purchasing Co. v. Boston
Mining Co., 27 Mont. 288, 323, 70 P. 1114 (1902); and Tomten v. Thomas, 125 Mont.

159, 162, 232 P.2d 723 (1951).
mTomten v. Thomas, supra note 100 at 162-168.
'"State Highway Comm'n v. Heltborg, supra note 78 at 204-205.
'0The rule that attorney's and appraiser's fees are not recoverable in a condemnation
action is partially abrogated by the new constitution. Article II, & 29 of this document
provides: "In the event of litigation, just compensation shall include necessary expenses of litigation to be awarded by the court when the private property owner prevails." The convention intended that "necessary expenses of litigation'' include ''all
costs including appraiser's fees, attorney fees and court costs." PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, p. 5632 (1972). This provision was incorporated in the
new constitution ''to give substance to the citizen's effort to challenge the compensation figure of the condemnor''; to ''produce a climate in which the condemnor's offer
for compensation will more adequately reflect the compensation to which the property
owner is entitled''; and to "redress the imbalance between the vast resources brought
to bear by the state and those available to the individual property owner in contested
cases." PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, p. 5632 (1972).
There are two problems with this provision. First, the convention delegates clearly
intended that the landowner was the prevailing party if he received an award in excess
of that offered by the condemnor. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
pp. 5638-5640 (1972). In so doing the delegates overlooked a very important fact:
one cannot realistically tell who prevails unless he looks at what is demanded by both
parties. One who is awarded one dollar more than the condemnor's offer will certainly
not feel triumphant and prevailing when he had demanded several hundred (or thousand) dollars more than he was offered. The assertion by the convention delegates
that this will in fact be the case is absurd and ridiculous.
In the author's opinion a much more realistic notion of prevailing is to treat it as
relative to the amount which the award exceeds the condemnor's offer and approaches
or equals the landowner's demand. The author suggests the following formulas; one
who is awarded in excess of fifty per cent of the difference between the condemnor's
offer and landowner 's demand plus the amount of the condemnor's offer prevails
fully; but one who receives less than this amount prevails only to the extent of double
the percentage which the amount of his recovery, less the condemnor's offer, bears to
the difference between the landowner's demand and the condemnor's offer. Thus, if
a condemnor offered $10,000 and the landowner demanded $20,000, the landowner
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104
The hardship which this
to the condemnation are not compensable.
Highway Comm'n.105
State
v.
Bakken
by
illustrated
is
well
cause
rule may
In this case the landowner sued to recover depreciation in the market
value of his realty caused by a public announcement, five years previous,
to the effect that his land was included within the boundaries of a proposed highway. The owner, a home building contractor, was unable,
since the time of the public announcement, to market his realty for
home building. To Bakken's plea of injustice the Montana court huffed:
"[L]and is not damaged by reason of preliminary procedure looking to
its appropriation to a public use."'10 6 The court was wrong on the facts,
but right on the law. Under R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9913 the owner's right
to compensation does not accrue until summons is served.

Finally, a judgment of noncompensability is sometimes based on
simple justice. For example, where a public improvement, which enhances the value of property, results in a special levy against a condemned landowner, the landowner will not be compensated for the
special assessment. 10 7 To hold that the special assessment is compensable
damage would be unjustified special treatment to one lucky enough
to have been condemned for the improvement, for it would allow
him to escape paying for benefits for which others are required to
08
pay.
As pointed out above, just compensation is not necessarily full
indemnity for all losses suffered by the landowner. Simple justice,
practical considerations, the nature of the right taken or damaged,
arbitrary statutory rules, and the market value standard are all factors
which limit full indemnity recovery. In some cases the limitation is
justified, but in others it seems unwarranted and excessive.
To those distressed by some of these limitations on full indemnity
there is one mitigating factor to consider, and this is the jury. Though
as a matter of law just compensation may not always provide a realistic
measure of damages, the jury may provide a means by which this
standard can be made to bend. What the laws deem noncompensable

would prevail fully if he was awarded more than $15,000. If the landowner was
awarded only $14,000, he would prevail only to the extent of eighty per cent. In this
latter example the landowner would be awarded only eighty per cent of his necessary
expenses of litigation.
The second problem with the new provision is its potential for abuse in compensating
attorneys and apprasers. It does not seem right that an award to the landowner that
exceeds the condemnor's offer by a mere dollar ought to be sufficient for granting
full attorneys' and appraisers' fees. But because our new founding fathers interpret
''prevails'' in an absolute sense, this is a very real possibility. Perhaps legislation
or a constitutional amendment is in order to correct this obvious potential for abuse.
0
' 'Bakken v. State Highway Comm'n, 142 Mont. 166, 169, 382 P.2d 550 (1963).
1Id.
"Id. at 169; see also, State Highway Comm 'n v. Robertson & Blossom, supra note 46 at
220-222.
=State Highway Comm'n v. Donovan, 152 Mont. 282, 287-288, 448 P.2d 671 (1968).
101d. at 288.
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may, as a practical matter, be compensable. As Orgel has put it: "The
fact that the property owners are usually not only willing but anxious
to have their properties condemned testifies to the widespread belief
109
that awards in condemnation proceedings are liberal."
E.

Deduction of Benefits

In certain cases the condemnor may show benefits which accrue to
the landowner because of the public improvement which causes him
damage. If the jury agrees, these benefits may be deducted from the
landowner's award of just compensation.
R.C.M. 1947, § 93-9912 provides that in assessing just compensation
it must be determined
[H]ow much the portion not sought to be condemned . . .will be
benefited, if at all, by the construction of the improvements proposed
by the plaintiff, and if the benefits shall be equal to the amount
assessed [for damages to the remainder] . . , the owner of the
parcel shall be allowed no compensation except the value of the
portion taken; but if the benefits shall be less than the amount
the former shall be
assessed [for damages to the remainder] ....
deducted from the latter, and the remainder shall be the only amount
allowed in addition to the value.
Although this statute does not mention deduction of benefits where
there is a damage without a taking, such a deduction has been allowed. 110
Also, since the statute provides that benefits may be deducted only from
damages, the question of such a deduction arises only in a partial
taking case or one in which damage is inflicted without a taking. Benefits may not under this statute be deducted from compensation for that
which is taken."1
1 2
Like damages, benefits, to be deductible, must be permanent,
caused by the public improvement which caused the damage," 3 reasonably certain," 4 and must increase the market value of the land. 1 5 Also,
in the case of a partial taking the remainder itself must be benefited;
benefits to independent parcels of the owner's land may not be considered. 116

Finally, there is in Montana an important judicially imposed restriction on benefits: to be deductible they must be special. 1' 7 A special
benefit is: (1) a physical improvement of the property which cannot

u*2

ORoEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINNT DoMAIn,

§

247 (2d

'"Eby v. City of Lewistown, supra note 67 at 127-128.

ed.

1953).

"'An excellent critique of the rule that benefits may not be deducted from compensation
for land taken is contained in EMINENT DOMAIN, A Research Report Prepared by the
University of Montana School of Law for the Montana State Highway Commission,
at 182-185 (1967).
"23 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 8.62[2] (3d ed. 1965).
1AId.at § 8.6201.
='Id.
n"1d. at § 8.62[2].
u'State v. Bradshaw Land Co., supra note 50 at 110; Gallatin Valley Elec. Ry. v. Neible,
57 Mont. 27, 34, 186 P. 689 (1919).
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be altered to the property's detriment without compensation; or (2)
a conferral on the property of some right or privilege which cannot be
destroyed or impaired without compensation. 1 8 An example of the first
kind of special benefit is where a highway is constructed in such a
fashion that the condemnor becomes obliged to provide the land with
necessary drainage. 119 An example of the second class of special benefit
is where a street is constructed so that the abutting property acquires
easements of light, air, and access. 12 0 The reader will note that the
characteristics of special benefits are very similar to those of special
damages inflicted without a taking, discussed above.
PERMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF VALUE
A number of factors merit consideration by the fact-finder in
attempting to arrive at an award of just compensation. In an appropriate case these might include the following: a view of the affected
property by the fact-finder, usually the jury; the use, condition, and
location of the property; the income, if any, produced by the property;
the value of improvements, if any, which are affected; sales of and
offers for the sale of the property affected or similar property; and
the opinions of competent witnesses.
THE JURY VIEW

When realty is the subject matter of a condemnation action, a view
by the jury of the property affected is often essential to their understanding of the case and the intelligent assessment of just compensation. To this end, R.C.M. 1947, § 93-5102 provides that:
When, in the opinion of the court, it is proper for the jury to have
a view of the property which is the subject of litigation . . . it may
order them to be conducted, in a body, under the charge of an officer,
and one person representing each party, to the place, which shall
be shown to them by the person appointed by the court for that
purpose. While the jury are thus absent, no person, other than
the person so appointed, shall speak to them on any subject connected with the trial and such person shall not speak to the jury
upon any matters connected with the subject of the action, but may
point out to the jury the property in litigation....
In addition to the important procedural requirements for the conduct of the view, set forth in the statute itself, a number of important
rules about a jury view have been judicially imposed. First, as the
statute indicates, whether a view by the jury will be permitted is within
the discretion of the trial court."' Second, the view should be taken
at a point in the trial when "it is known what are the various items of
damages to be considered in the light of the trial court's rulings on
"BGallatin Valley Elec. Ry. v. Neible, supra note 117 at 34-35.
Mid.
'Id.

mClark v. Worrall, 146 Mont. 374, 378-379, 406 P.2d 822 (1965); Puetz v. Carloon, 139
Mont. 373, 382, 364 P.2d 742 (1961); and Maloney v. King, 30 Mont. 158, 172, 76 P. 4
(1904).
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the admission and rejection of offered testimony."'2 2 This lessens the
danger of having the jury's attention directed to elements of damage
12 3
or portions of the property not properly within their consideration.
Finally, the evidential effect of the jury view is twofold in Montana:
(1) it enables the jury to understand the case; and (2) it aids the
124
jury in determining the truth or falsity of the other evidence presented.
In other words, the view is both real and demonstrative evidence.
Consequently, in determining what is just compensation the jury may
properly take into account the result of their observation of the affected
1 25
property.
USE, CONDITION, AND LoCATION OF THE PROPERTY

Since just compensation is measured by market value, evidence
may be introduced concerning the uses to which the property is adapted,
its location and condition, the character of the neighborhood, and all
things surrounding the property. 26 All of these are factors which a
willing purchaser would consider in ascertaining the property's market
127
value.
Of these factors, use is the most significant, for the owner is not
restricted to showing the market value for the use to which the land
is presently put. The standard of value is the market value of the
land based on the highest and best use for which it is available.1 28
Property is not to be deemed worthless because the owner allows
it to go to waste, or to be regarded as valueless because he is unable
to put it to any use. Its capability of being made ... available [for
a prospective and more valuable use] gives it a market value
which can be readily estimated.""
What is the highest and best use of land is a question of fact.'30
Moreover, though highest and best use usually means a single use, if two
or more uses are compatible and the owner is deprived of all of them,
the owner is entitled to compensation for the loss in market value which
the land has by virtue of its adaptability for several uses.' 3 '

'State v. Bradshaw Land Co., supra note 50 at 111.
ImId.
'Ferris v. McNally, 45 Mont. 20, 31, 121 P. 889 (1912); State v. Bradshaw Land Co.,
supra note 50 at 111; State v. Lee, supra note 9 at 486.
'White v. Barling, 36 Mont. 413, 417, 93 P. 348 (1908); Murray v. Heinze, 17 Mont.
353, 357, 42 P. 1057 (1895); and Ormund v. Granite Mountain Mining Co., 11 Mont.
303, 309, 28 P. 289 (1891).
'State Highway Comm'n v. Peterson, supra note 9 at 70-71.
=Id.
'State Highway Comm'n v. Vaughan, supra note 8 at 282; State Highway Comm'n v.
Jacobs, supra note 9 at 326; State Highway Comm'n v. Woodcock, supra note 9 at
294; State Highway Comm'n v. Wheeler, 148 Mont. 246, 255, 419 P.2d 492 (1966);
State Highway Comm 'n v. Peterson, supra note 9 at 71; State v. Bradshaw Land Co.,
supra note 50 at 109; State v. Hoblitt, supra note 9 at 413; Sweeney v. Montana Central Ry. Co., supra note 69 at 561; Northern Pac. & Mont. Ry. Co. v. Forbis, 15 Mont.
452, 455, 39 P. 571 (1895); and Montana Railway Co. v. Warren, supra note 72 at
284.
"'Montana Railway Co. v. Warren, supra note 72 at 280.
ImState Highway Comm 'n v. Vaughan, supra note 8 at 282, 285.
'Northern Pac. & Mont. Ry. Co. v. Forbis, supra note 128 at 457-458.
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The single limitation on proof of a prospective use is that the land
must be adaptable or available for the prospective use. Since the market
value at the date of summons controls, "the land must be shown to have
been marketable at that time for the purpose stated ...;the showing
must be that the use is one to which the land may reasonably be applied
. . , such as would probably affect a purchaser ....,"132 Speculative, remote, conjectural, and problematical uses may not be considered, 133 nor
uses which are dreams "concocted or contrived with the purpose of
1 34
obtaining a larger settlement.'
INCOME PRODUCED By THE PROPERTY

Income produced by the use to which the affected property is
presently applied may in some cases be used as a means of arriving
at an estimate of the property's market value.13 5 Usually net income
is capitalized to present the fact-finder with an estimate of market
value in terms of income. When capitalization of income is used, the
property's market value is said to be the sum which will, in accordance
with the prevailing local rate of earning for property of a given
location and character, produce annually a sum equivalent to the net
136
annual income of the affected property.
An income approach to valuation is usually allowed only when
the property's income is attributable to the property itself, and not to
the owner's skill. 137 The reason for this limitation is that in a condemnation action the standard of just compensation is the market value
of that which is taken or damaged. Property, and not the owner's skill,
is all that is taken or damaged in condemnation.
An income approach is usually allowed in the case of rental property, since, "[W]hen property is leased, the rent is derived almost
13
entirely from the property.'
On the other hand, an income approach to the value of commercial
business property is impermissible. Nichols forcefully explains the rationale for this exclusion as follows:
'State v. Hoblitt, supra note 9 at 413; State Highway Comm 'n v. Vaughan, supra note
8 at 282; and State Highway Comm 'n v. Woodcock, supra note 9 at 294.
'eState Highway Comm'n v. Antonioli, supra note 60 at 417; State v. Bradshaw Land
Co., supra note 50 at 109; and State v. Hoblitt, supra note 9 at 414.
'"State Highway Comm'n v. Woodcock, supra note 9 at 295; State Highway Comm'n v.
Milanovich, supra note 10 at 417.
inThe use of income evidence is related to the determination of what is the highest and
best use of the property. As stated in 5 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 19.1 (3d ed.
1969) :If the owner relies upon his actual income from the property as furnishing a fair test of its value, he tacitly admits that the use to which
the property is devoted is the most advantageous use to which it could
be put . . . . If, on the other hand, the condemnor . . . . seeks to
bring out the actual income from the property, it should be first
obliged to offer evidence that the use to which the land was actually
put was one of the uses to which the land was best adopted . ...
M5 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAN, § 19.23 (3d ed. 1969).
17d. at § 19.1[1].
-Id. at § 19.2.
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If the owner of property uses it himself for commercial purposes,
the amount of his profits from the business conducted upon the
property depends so much upon the capital employed and the fortune,
skill and good management with which the business is conducted,
that it furnishes no test of the value of the property. It is, accordingly, well settled that evidence of the profits of a business conducted upon the land taken for the public use is not admissible
in proceedings for the determination of the compensation which
the owner of the land shall receive. The profits of a business are
too uncertain and depend on too many contingencies safely to be
accepted as any evidence of the usable value of the property upon
which business is carried on....
It has been said that it is the land which is appropriated [or
damaged], and not the business conducted thereon. While it is
proper to show, as bearing on the value of the property, that it [is]
pecularily adapted for a particular business, the success of an enterprise does not depend upon its location alone, but rather upon the
skill and ability of the proprietor, and the manner in which he
conducts his business.
Whether agricultural land can be valued by an income approach is
an issue on which the courts are about evenly divided. Though to a
lesser degree, the same elements that preclude the income approach for
commercial business property enter into the result when the owner
uses his land for agricultural or ranching purposes. On the other hand,
"the actual return is in such case some evidence of the value of the
40
land."1
The general law on the use of the income approach has been set
forth for the purpose of contrast. When compared with other jurisdictions, Montana's case law on this subject may be considered only an
erroneous oddity.
The Montana court's difficulty with the income approach began
with the following anomalous statement in State Highway Comm'n v.
Peterson:
Questions relative to revenue produced from the property taken
is undoubtedly admissible for the purpose of arriving at the market
value of the property. Where sales are in process of being made,
income could become an important factor in arriving at market
value. In all cases where a seller is ready and willing to sell, and
a purchaser is ready and willing to buy, and involving sales of
hotels, bars, cafes, garages, farms, service stations, stores and
the like, a purchaser naturally wants to know something about gross
income, gross expenses and net profit before buying. Therefore,
in condemnation proceedings, such evidence is admissible for the
purpose of arriving at the market value for such is a circumstance,
but not a conclusive circumstance, to be shown on an issue of value.
In many cases involving the taking of agricultural lands, evidence
of revenue is considered for the purpose of arriving at market
value.'
Insofar as Peterson allows an income approach to show the value of rental
or agricultural property, there can be no harsh complaint. However,
insofar as Peterson allows this approach for commercial business prop-

mId. at § 19.3[1].

"ld.at § 19.3[2].

'"State Highway Comm'n v. Peterson, supra note 9 at 63-64; and see, State Highway
Comm'n v. Heltborg, supra note 78 at 201.
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erty, to that extent the law of Montana is unique, and, in the author's
opinion, erroneous. The long quotation set forth from Nichols adequately
explains why the income approach should be prohibited in the case of
commercial business property.
For a time it appeared that the court had corrected the position
taken in Peterson. In State Highway Comm'n v. Bare,142 the court quoted
with approval from the 1962 Report of the Committee on Condemnation
and Condemnation Procedure of the Section of Local Government Law
of the American Bar Association:
[T]he "income method" may be used to determine market value,
where appropriate ....
However, the majority of courts restrict this
type of testimony. This stems in part from the principle that business profits are considered too speculative to be considered in determining
value, and partly because courts view comparable sales as a
more ' objective test. Rental property, however, is an exception to
this rule.
Within two years of Bare, however, the Peterson rule was reaffirmed
twice. 4 4 It appears that in spite of what was said in Bare, the Peterson
rule is the present Montana law on the use of the income approach to
valuation.
In the author's opinion the Peterson rule is a most unsatisfactory
one, since it allows the use of an income approach to value certain
kinds of commercial business properties. This method in such a case is
highly speculative, since it measures not only the market value of property, which is the sole consideration in computing just compensation,
but also the value of business skill and good will, which are not taken
or damaged by condemnation.
VALUE OF IMPROVENMENTS

Where improvements affixed to the property are taken or damaged,
their value may be shown as an element of the value of realty taken
or damaged, if they enhance the realty's value. 145
The value of improvements may be shown in the same manner as
the value of other property. Where, however, an income approach is
impermissible and the improvement is of a kind seldom sold, so that
its true market price is difficult to determine, the Montana court has
permitted improvements to be valued by computing reproduction cost
46
less depreciation.
1141 Mont. 288, 377 P.2d 357 (1962); and see, State Highway Comm'n v. Smith &
Jesson, 141 Mont. 302, 377 P.2d 352 (1962).
"State Highway Comm'n v. Bare, supra note 139 at 300.
'"State Highway Comm'n v. Crow, 142 Mont. 270, 273-275, 384 P.2d 273 (1963) (trailer
court rental) ; State Highway Comm 'n v. McGaffick, supra note 95 at 80 (gas station).
'State Highway Comm 'n v. Peterson, supra note 9 at 64.
'"State Highway Comm 'n v. Tubbs, supra note 6 at 302-303. While not expressed in the
Montana decision, 5 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 20.2(11] (3d ed. 1969) explains the
reason for restricting the use of reproduction cost as a method for valuing improvements:
This rule stems from a recognition of the fact that reproduction cost

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1973

23

Montana Law
Review,
Vol. 34 [1973],
THE
MONTANA
LAWIss. 1, Art. 6

1973]

Reproduction cost may be computed in two ways. First, a unit
cost is determined (for example, so many dollars per square foot), and
this unit cost is then simply multiplied by the number of units contained in the improvement. Second, an estimate of materials and construction costs may be made. 'While there are no Montana decisions
on this point, the second method should be preferred since it requires
a more specific itemization of the expenses on which the estimate is
47
based.1
In computing the proper deduction for depreciation in Montana
both structural depreciation resulting from physical deterioration and
functional depreciation due to obsolescence and loss of adaptability may
48
be considered.'
SALES AND OFFERS

A.

Sales

Evidence of sales to prove the market value of the property affected
may be divided into two categories: sales of the property affected and
sales of similar property (a comparable sale).
Though there is no Montana law on the subject, a sale of the
property affected should be allowed as evidence when it was made
voluntarily and in good faith; covers substantially the same property
as that which is affected; and, since the time of the sale to the date of
service of the summons, neither the market nor conditions have fluct149
uated markedly.
There are two problems with the admission of comparable sales.
First, some jurisdictions reject such evidence on the ground that it introduces a multitude of collateral issues which serve only to confuse the
jury and direct their attention away from the central issue-determining the value of the property affected. 150 This contention is met
with the fact that only comparable sales may be used, and with the
conclusion, with which the author agrees, that evidence of sales of
comparable property is the most convenient, direct, and reliable measurement of the market value of the affected property. 15' The Montana

evidence almost invariably tends to inflate valuation. This is so because the reproduction cost of a structure sets an absolute ceiling on
the market price of that structure, a ceiling which may not be, and
frequently is not, even approached in actual market negotiation. When
this inherently inflationary attribute of reproduction cost evidence is

considered in light of the misleading exactitude which such evidence
almost invariably imports to a jury unsophisticated in the niceties of

economics, the justification for placing substantial safeguards upon
its admission is apparent.
1175NIcHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 20.2[3] (3d ed. 1969).
"State Highway Comm'n v. Tubbs, supra note 6 at 303.
15 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 21.2 (3d ed. 1969).
'id.
at § 21.3[1].
m
Id.
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court has adopted the preferable view, holding on a number of occasions
that: "One of the most reliable tests . 1' .5 .2 on the question of fair market
value . . . is that of comparable sales.'
The second problem concerning comparable sales evidence concerns its method of introduction. The easiest way to introduce such
evidence is merely to have one who knows of the prices paid relate
them directly. Though there are technical hearsay and best evidence
objections to this method, a majority of jurisdictions, including Montana, have made exceptions to the best evidence and hearsay rules
in such cases. "The various reasons given for admitting the comparable
sales and prices paid is that with proper safeguards the testimony
should be consistently reliable and much more time conserving than if
all the parties [to the sales] had to be called."' 15 3
To be used to determine the market value of the affected property,
the sale of other property must first be shown to be comparable. To
decide what constitutes a sufficient comparability there is no set
formula. The decision varies with the facts of each case.5 4 The factors
that should be given consideration by the trial court in determining
whether a sale is of sufficient comparability to aid the jury are: location, 155 condition, 156 size, shape, and use 157 of the property; the time of
sale ;158 and the nature of the sale,' 9 that is, whether it was forced or
made in a free and open market between a willing seller and a willing
buyer.
A question which has arisen but has not yet been decided in Montana is whether evidence of a negotiated comparable sale of land subject to condemnation by the plaintiff-condemnor may be used to arrive
at the value of the land condemned. 6 0 A majority of jurisdictions exclude such evidence on the ground that it involves a forced, involuntary

u2State Highway Comm'n v. Tubbs, supra note 6 at 303; State Highway Comm'n v.
Greenfield, 145 Mont. 164, 170, 399 P.2d 989 (1965); State Highway Comm'n v.
Voyich, 142 Mont. 355, 362, 384 P.2d 765 (1963); State Highway Comm'n v. Bare,
supra note 142 at 300.
u3State Highway Comm 'n v. Greenfield, supra note 152 at 167.
'"The decision also varies according to how the evidence of comparable sales is being
used. In State Highway Comm'n v. Jacobs, supra note 9 at 328 the Montana court
said:
When a price paid for another piece of property is offered as evidence
of the value of property sought to be condemned a strong similarity
between the two parcels must be shown to exist ....
However, when
the value of another piece of property is testified to . . . for the purpose of showing the basis for an expert's knowledge of the market
and his opinion of value, the requirement of similarity is not so strict
5State Highway Comm'n v. Greenfield, supra note 152 at 167.
1State Highway Comm'n v. Churchwell, 146 Mont. 52, 60-61, 403 P.2d 751 (1965).
Imid.
lzState Highway Comm'n v. Jacobs, supra note 9 at 328; State Highway Comm'n v.
Greenfield, supra note 152 at 170; State Highway Comm'n v. Voyich, supra note 152
at 362; State Highway Comm'n v. Bare, supra note 142 at 300.
InState Highway Comm 'n v. Jacobs, supra note 9 at 328.
InThis issue was raised in State Highway Comm ' v. Voyich, supra note 152, but the
court reserved judgment for lack of a proper objection.
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sale, and so is not evidence of market value-based on a willing-buyer/
willing-seller concept.1 ' However, some jurisdictions treat the question
simply as one of proof; that is, such evidence is admissible if it is first
shown that the price paid in the negotiated purchase6 2was not influenced
by the threat of condemnation and fear of litigation.
B.

Offers

Offers to sell or purchase the affected property or comparable
property, no matter by whom or to whom made, are not admissible to
determine the market value of the affected property.'3 Two reasons
have been given for this exclusion: (1) it constitutes hearsay; and (2)
it raises too many collateral issues to justify an exception to the hearsay
rule. 16 Offers are easy to fabricate. Often they are based on inadequate
knowledge, made under circumstances not involving potentially binding
responsibility. While the problem is basically one of proof that the
offer was made in good faith and with the intent to purchase or sell
once accepted, these facts would be difficult to verify objectively in
the typical informal offer situation.
OPINIONS

Of all the evidence that may be used to ascertain the value of
property in a condemnation action, opinion evidence is the most important. Opinion evidence has been the subject of more discussion by the
Montana supreme court than any other kind of valuation evidence.
This is simply a reflection of the fact that, as a practical matter,
opinion evidence is the means by which market value is most often
shown. This is in spite of the fact that opinion evidence is advisory
only. The jury may give to opinions the weight they deem proper
65
or may reject them altogether if they find them unsound.
As is the case with all opinion testimony, "it is in the discretion
of the trial judge to determine who are competent to give opinions
on value."' 66 What standards, then, are to guide the trial judge in
making this determination? The question at present is an extremely
difficult one, since recent Montana decisions on this point have been
woefully inconsistent.
The decisions are all agreed on the fundamental rule of qualifi-

inState Highway Comm 'n v. Voyich, supra note 152 at 361-362.

105

NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN,

§ 21.33 (3d ed. 1969).

mHelena Power Transmission Co. v. McLean, 38 Mont. 388, 392, 99 P. 1061 (1909);
Yellowstone Park R.R. Co. v. Bridger Coal Co., supra note 11 at 557-559.
1
6State
1m

Highway Comm 'n v. Vaughan, supra note 8 at 287.
State Highway Comm'n v. Wilcox, 155 Mont. 176, 181, 468 P.2d 749 (1970); State
Highway Comm'n v. Barnes, supra note 81 at 305; Alexander v. State Highway
Comm'n, 142 Mont. 93, 110, 381 P.2d 280 (1963); State Highway Comm'n v. Keneally,
supra note 93 at 262; and State Highway Comm'n v. Peterson, supra note 9 at 63.
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cation for an opinion witness 1 7 and his opinion. The witness must
have and use "some peculiar means of forming an intelligent and correct
judgment as to the value of the property in question beyond what is
presumed to be possessed by men generally.' 6 8 This same standard
was expressed more informally (but also more accurately considering
its application) as requiring a mere showing that the witness "knew
more than the ordinary person on the street about the subject in
question."' 16 9
All of the decisions translate the "some peculiar means" standard
into at least this basic requirement: the witness must know the real
property in question, be familiar with the uses to which it is or may
be put, and base his estimate of value on this knowledge. 7 0 An opinion
of value was held improper where the witness valued a cement mixing
plant on the basis of what the plant ought to have been rather than
what it in fact was. 17 Likewise, an opinion as to the value of a mineral
deposit was held improper where there was not presented as a foundation "evidence of any core drilling, surface or subsurface sampling,
geological reconnaissance, geophysical exploration, geochemical analyses,
or smelter reports of former production.' 72 For the witness and his
opinion to be competent, the witness must be familiar with those real
attributes which give value to the affected property, and, furthermore,
his opinion must be based on his evaluation of these attributes.
Beyond the rudimentary requirement of familiarity with the affected
property, it is difficult to say what is required for the competency of
the witness and his opinion. It seems reasonable to require something
and
167The term "opinion witness" is used instead of the more conventional "expert"
'non-expert,"
since the author believes the term "opinion witness" describes most
accurately the witness who may express an opinion of market value. In some instances
the Montana court refers to this witness as "not . . . a technical expert" (State
Highway Comm'n v. Peterson, supra note 9 at 63) and in other instances as "an expert" (State Highway Comm'n v. Jacobs, supra note 9 at 327). There is a technical
distinction between an expert and a non-expert. An expert is ''A witness who has
special training, education or experience in a particular science, profession or calling
.... " State Highway Comm'n v. Donovan, supra note 107 at 288. However, the
Montana court has not observed this distinction in condemnation actions, and has
applied the same standard of qualification to both technical experts and non-experts.
The only practical difference the distinction between expert and non-expert makes is
in a case where all of the witnesses are experts. Here the jury instruction as to how
to judge their opinion will be the standard expert witness instruction rather than that
which is used exclusively in condemnation cases to determine whether a witness is
qualified to render an opinion as to value. State Highway Comm'n v. Donovan, supra
note 107 at 288-290.
168
State Highway Comm'n v. Peterson, supra note 9 at 63; State Highway Comm'n v.
Wilcox, supra note 166 at 181; State Highway Comm'n v. Barnes, supra note 81 at
305; Alexander v. State Highway Comm'n, supra note 166 at 110; and State Highway
Comm'n v. Keneally, supra note 93 at 262.
-State Highway Comm'n v. Jacobs, supra note 9 at 327.
"'City of Three Forks v. State Highway Comm'n, 156 Mont. 392, 396-397, 480 P.2d
826 (1971) ; State Highway Comm'n v. Wilcox, supra note 166 at 180-181; State Highway Comm'n v. Barnes, supra note 81 at 305; Alexander v. State Highway Comm'n,
supra note 166 at 110; State Highway Comm'n v. Keneally, supra note 93 at 262;
State Highway Comm'n v. Peterson, supra note 9 at 63; and Montana Railway Co. v.
Warren, supra note 72 at 283.
inAlexander v. State Highway Comm'n, supra note 166 at 97-104.
"'State Highway Comm 'n v. Antonioli, supra note 60 at 416.
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more of an opinion witness, but to say that this is the law in Montana
would be an incompetent opinion on the author's part, resting on sheer
speculation and conjecture. The problem with stating the Montana
law is that the court has been less than meticulous in setting it forth.
Since the rules of law cannot be stated in one-two-three-order, the best
method of analysis is a case-by-case consideration of four recent Montana decisions.
The first case is State Highway Comm'n v. Barnes.173 In this case
the opinion testimony of a number of witnesses was rejected on the
'1 74
ground that it was based on mere "personal opinion" or "experience.'
There was no question but that the witnesses were familiar with the
affected property and the uses to which it could be put. But the court
required something more than mere familiarity to meet the "some
peculiar means" standard; the opinion testimony had to be based on
"an accepted method of arriving at value. '175 The three accepted methods,
discussed above, are use of comparable sales, capitalization of net
income, and computation of reproduction cost of improvements less depreciation. The opinion witness would probably not, under Barnes,
have been required to consciously apply these technical appraisal techniques. However, to be acceptable, the basis for the opinion would
have to be translatable into an appropriate one or more of these accepted
appraisal techniques. The distinction is that, though the witness need
not possess the expert's background knowledge, he must, under the
Barnes interpretation of the "some peculiar means" standard, testify
like an expert-using, perhaps unknowingly, the expert's techniques.
Two years later the court retreated from Barnes in State Highway
Comm'n v. Wilcox. 176 Wilcox held that an opinion based on four admittedly non-comparable sales and rendered by one who simply knew
the affected property and its uses was an opinion by one who had used
77
the requisite "some peculiar means.'
The crowning blow to Barnes came one year later in City of Three
Forks v. State Highway Comm'n.1 8 The court held that a witness who.
knew the affected property and its potential uses was competent to
render an opinion as to its value. 179 It appeared also that the witness'
opinion need only be based on knowledge of the property and its
potential uses. No longer was the witness required to arrive at his
opinion in a fashion that could be deemed an "accepted method of

13 State Highway Comm'n v. Barnes, supra note 81.
1
"State Highway Comm 'n v. Barnes, supra note 81 at 305-307.
17Id. at 306.
1
7State Highway Comm'n v. Wilcox, supra note 166.
7Id. at 178-181.
17City of Three Forks v. State Highway Comm'n, supra note 170.
79I.

at 396-397.
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arriving at value." Barnes was dead. Wilcox was appropriately cited' 80
for this new and more lax rule on the requirements of market value
opinions.' 8 '
One year later the court started what may signal the beginning
of the redemption of Barnes. The pendulum came close to a full swing
(again) in State Highway Comm'n v. Metcalf. s 2 A witness was allowed
to testify to the value of a gypsum deposit when he had never seen
the deposit, knew nothing of gypsum, had never studied the economic
aspects of the gypsum market, had no knowledge of the quality standards applicable to the chemical compound to make it commercially
marketable, and had never investigated any gypsum deposits. 83 In
holding that the witness lacked the requisite "peculiar means" the court
emphasized the fact that the witness had no means by which to determine the value of gypsum, since he knew nothing about the values of
gypsum in the market or in place. 8 4 This is a higher standard than that
applied in Wilcox and City of Three Forks, which required mere familiarity with the land and its potential uses. Under these cases, knowledge
of market value was imputed by simple familiarity. But under Metcalf,
the court required something more than mere familiarity. Though the
decision is not as clear as Barnes, the court seemed to require some
knowledge of the worth of the property in the market, knowledge
that can be obtained only by applying an accepted appraisal technique
like comparable sales, income, or reproduction cost of improvements
less depreciation. This, of course, is the rule of Barnes. While the
author does not believe that Metcalf necessarily marks a complete
return to Barnes, it is a step in this direction. To see whether Barnes
is to be fully reinstated we must await future decisions.
To the general rule of opinion testimony, whatever it now is, there
was, and may still be, one exception. This exception concerns the
opinion of the landowner himself. In Alexander v. State Highway
Comm'n, 85 the court announced its rule governing a landowner's opinion:
[A]n owner, upon prima facie proof of ownership, shall be qualified
to estimate in a reasonable way the value of his property for the
use to which he has been putting it. Such owner is not qualified by
virtue of ownership alone to testify as to its value for other purposes
unless he possess, as any other witness as to value, "some peculiar
means of forming an intelligent and correct judgment as to the value
of the property in question beyond what is presumed to be possessed
by men generally."'8
Id. at 397.

rmin all fairness to the court it must be noted that the test used in City of Three Forks
has its origin in the very famous old Montana case of Montana Railway Co. v. Warren,
supra note 72. In Warren it was said, at 283, that "Witnesses who know the property,
and are familiar with the uses to which it may be put, can give their opinions as to
the market value."
, 500 P.2d 951 (1972).
1 .....
Mont. .......
11Id. at 954.
1"Id. at 955.

'-"Alexander v. State Highway Comm'n, supra note 166.
2ftId. at 110.
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This "reasonable way" standard is an equitable one,' 8 7 and appears to be
directed at the amount of the owner's estimate in light of the facts of the
case, rather than at the knowledge on which the opinion is based. 188
"Reasonable" has been defined as "not incredible,"' 1 9 and "being in
agreement with right thinking or right judgment; not conflicting with
reason: not absurd: not ridiculous: not extreme: not excessive: possessing good sound judgment: well balanced: sensible."'' 90 The vagueness of the definition indicates the elasticity and subjectivity of the
standard. A landowner may, without any basis whatsoever, render an
opinion of value for the use to which he is putting his land. The opinion
is objectionable only if excessive in amount in light of other facts and
testimony.
The problem with the landowner exception is whether it is still
the law in Montana. Probably it is, but two decisions subsequent to
Alexander cast a shadow of doubt on the vitality of the exception. In
Barnes and Wilcox the court measured landowners' opinions as to the
value of their land for the use to which they were putting it by the
more strict standard of "some peculiar means." 91
In neither case did the court express a conscious intent to overrule
Alexander. In fact, in Barnes the court said it was following Alexander!192
Also, in the later case of City of Three Forks the court alluded to a
special rule concerning the property owner's value opinion.193 This leads
the author to the tentative conclusion that Alexander is still the law.
One may only speculate about what the court had in mind in Barnes
and Wilcox. As with the treatment of other opinion testimony on market
value, the court was not too meticulous in applying or discarding prior
precedent.
Montana's law of opinion testimony on market value in condemnation
cases needs substantive revision. For reasons unarticulated in their
decisions, the court has carved out an exception to the general rule of
R.C.M. 1947, § 93-401-27(9) that only experts are competent to render
opinion evidence. To express an opinion of market value in a condemnation case one "need not be a technical expert."'1 94 And under City of
Three Forks, one need have no basis for his opinion other than familiarity
with the land and its potential uses. Landowners may be allowed to
express opinions under even more lax standards.
The only plausible reasons for permitting non-experts to give opinions
of market value are that they are competent to do so or experts are
"Id. at 109.
"Alexander v. State Highway Comm'n, supra note 5 at 369-371.
u*State Highway Comm'n v. Keneally, supra note 93 at 261.
'"Alexander v. State Highway Comm'n, supra note 166 at 109.
"'State Highway Comm'n v. Barnes, supra note 81 at 304-306; State Highway Comm 'n
v. Wilcox, supra note 166 at 180-181.
2°'State Highway Comm'n v. Barnes, supra note 81 at 305.
inCity of Three Forks v. State Highway Comm'n, supra note 170 at 396.
'"State Highway Comm 'n v. Peterson, supra note 9 at 63.
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scarce. Neither of these has validity today. Not only is the appraisal
of real property a growing profession, it has also become a highly specialized art, which requires knowledge and experience in the application
of technical appraisal methods.' 9 The appraisal of realty is a matter for
experts and experts are available. The time has come to abolish the
rule allowing non-expert opinions of market value in condemnation
cases.
To this end the author makes two proposals for legislation. First,
no one should be allowed to give opinion evidence of market value
unless he is an expert appraiser. If in the future real estate appraisers
are licensed by the state, perhaps licensure should be made a condition
to showing the requisite expertise. Second, as a check on the ethics
and competency of expert appraisers there should be established in an
appropriate state agency an Appraisal Review Committee composed of
real estate appraisers. In any case in which one valuation expert testifies
against another, the experts involved should be required to submit
to the Committee a written report stating the nature of the case and
their estimates of value. Where the divergence of opinion is minor no
further steps should be necessary. Where the divergence is significant,
the Committee should require a full appraisal report from each expert.
These reports should be subjected to careful analysis. If necessary, the
expert may be required to appear personally before the Committee.
If unethical conduct or incompetence is discovered, appropriate disciplinary sanctions should be invoked.
An Appraisal Review Committee is not a novel suggestion. The
procedures outlined above are identical to those presently used successfully by the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers.
Hopefully, adoption of these proposals would have a salutary effect
on the quality of the opinions of market value rendered in condemnation
cases in Montana.
1This is witnessed by the growing number of professional appraisal societies. These
societies include the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, the American Society of Appraisers, the American Right of Way Association, the American Society of
Farm Managers and Rural Appraisers, and the Society of Real Estate Appraisers.
That the appraisal of the value of realty requires special knowledge and experience,
consider, for example, that to achieve the professional designation M.A.I. granted by
the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers one must meet the following basic
requirements:
1. Graduation from an accredited four-year high school (Rule 1.110);
2. Two years full-time experience in the real estate vocation followed
by at least five years of experience in appraising or supervising the appraisal
of interests in real property (Rule 1.230);
3. Submission of three satisfactory demonstration appraisal reports
(Rule 1.240), in sufficient detail to enable the Admissions Committee to pass
on the reasonableness of the value estimate and the appraiser's grasp and
practical application of fundamental appraisal processes (Rule 1.312); and
4. Satisfactory completion of at least two written examinations covering such topics as highest and best use estimates, reproduction cost estimates,
depreciation theories and methods, methods of capitalizing net income, market
data interpretation, the nature of real property interests, and how to plan
an appraisal (Rules 1.160, 1.250, and 1.401).
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BURDEN OF PROOF

Though in civil actions the burden of proof is normally on the
plaintiff, this is not the usual rule in a condemnation action. In Montana the landowner-whether plaintiff or defendant-must bear the
burden of proving just compensation in excess of that offered by the
condemnor. 196
CONCLUSION
For the most part, Montana's law of valuation in eminent domain
is the same as that of most other jurisdictions. There are, however, at
least two areas of Montana's valuation law in need of reform. First,
though most jurisdictions forbid it, in Montana, in some cases, an
income approach may be used to value commercial business property.
For the reasons set forth previously, the author is of the opinion that
in this respect the Montana law on the income approach is unsatisfactory. This should be judicially corrected in an appropriate future
decision. Second, while most courts allow landowners and non-experts
to render opinions of market value in condemnation cases, 197 the Montana court has recently indicated a willingness to allow such witnesses
to render opinions under comparatively lax standards. In the author's
opinion the appraisal of the value of real property is today a matter for
experts. Only experts ought to be allowed to render opinions of market
value in condemnation cases. As a check on the ethics and competency
of these experts, their appraisals given in condemnation cases should be
subjected to review by a committee of appraisers established within an
appropriate state agency. Since this reform contemplates granting
additional powers and duties to an executive state agency, it requires
legislative action.

wState Highway Comm'n v. Barnes, supra note 81 at 309; State Highway Comm 'n v.
Churchwell, 146 Mont. 52, 62-63, 403 P.2d 751 (1965); State Highway Comm'n v.
Barovich, 142 Mont. 191, 193, 382 P.2d 917 (1963); State Highway Comm'n v. Peter-

son, supra note 9 at 73-75.

117See,

NICHOLS, EMINENT DomMiN,

§§ 18.4-18.42 (3d ed. 1969).
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